JACKIE LACEY, District Attorney of Los Angeles County MARY A. MURRAY, State Bar No. 185518 Deputy District Attorney 320 West Temple Street, Suite 780 Los Angeles, California 90012 Telephone: (213) 974-5985

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OF ORIGINAL FILED

Los Angeles Superior Court

FEB 0 5 2013

Attorneys for Plaintiff and Appellant

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOR THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,

Plaintiff,

v.

CHRISTOPHER M. BROWN

Defendant.

Case No. BA353571

NOTICE AND PETITION FOR PROBATION MODIFICATION

DATE: February 6, 2013

DEPT.: 123

INTRODUCTION

This is a petition by the People made pursuant to Penal Code Section 1203.2. subdivision (b) requesting that the Court find the Defendant in violation of the terms of his probation for failure to complete the 180 days of community labor as required by the Court's order of August 25, 2009. (See People's Exhibit 1, hereafter Exh. 1, at p.3.) As a consequence of said violation, the People respectfully request that this Court terminate the prior consent permitting Defendant to complete the community labor requirement out of state and modify the terms of his probation accordingly. Said request is based upon the attached Exhibits and Memorandum of Points and Authorities, which are incorporated by reference.

All further references will be to the Penal Code.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

On June 22, 2009, Defendant Chris Brown pled guilty to one felony count of assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury in violation of section 245, subdivision (a)(1). The Honorable Patricia Schnegg sentenced the Defendant to five years formal probation and as a condition of that probation required him to perform 180 days of community labor², complete a 52 week batterer's intervention program, and to pay associated fines and fees. The Court explicitly ordered the Defendant to perform "180 days of Cal Trans or graffiti removal (Physical Labor.)" (Exh. 1.)

On August 25, 2009, Defendant was placed on formal probation. Judge Schnegg granted the Defendant's request to complete the community labor and batterer's program in Virginia, via the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision (ICAOS). However, Los Angeles County Department of Probation was to maintain supervision of his probation.

Initially, the Probation Department's progress reports were calendared at 90 day intervals. Upon the Probation Department's report that the Defendant completed the batterer's intervention program and paid all fines, the Court began scheduling progress reports at six month intervals. The People assumed, as did the Court, that the Defendant had in fact complied with all terms and conditions of probation as indicated in the Probation Progress Reports, up through Probation Report No. 9, which was submitted to the Court on October 12, 2011. (See People's Exhibit 2, hereafter, Exh. 2.)

In summary, the following relevant information was submitted to the Court:

- 1. October 2011: Los Angeles County Probation reported 581 hours of community labor as of October 3, 2011;
- 2. November 8, 2011: A letter to the Honorable Judge Schnegg, signed by the Chief of the Richmond Police Department in Progress Report sequence No. 9,

² The term *community labor* was clear and designated purposefully to avoid confusion with a lesser requirement of *community service*.

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indicated that as of November 8, 2011 the Defendant "has performed 103 days of community labor" under his supervision. (It should be noted that completion of 103 days of labor at 8 hours a day is equivalent to 824 hours);

3. **February 8, 2012**: Three months later, the Interstate Commission for Adult Offender Supervision Office reported the Defendant "completed 701 hours of community labor thus far" and "is eligible to be released from further supervision." (It should be noted that completion of 180 days at 8 hours a day is 1440 hours of labor, not 701.)

The People informed the Court of the apparent discrepancies in these reports and repeatedly requested the Court to order any additional documentation, i.e. an "accounting," to clarify the inconsistent representations made to the Court. In response to the Court's request for supporting documentation, on September 21, 2012, the Los Angeles County Department of Probation submitted a spreadsheet contained in Progress Report sequence No. 12. The spreadsheet dated three years earlier (November 18, 2009) was prepared by the Richmond Police Department and purported to document all community labor performed between November 16, 2009 and August 8, 2012. (See People's Exhibit 3, hereafter Exh. 3.)

The People again objected to the lack of documentation and again requested corroboration for the accounting. On November 1, 2012, in response to the Court's request for additional accounting of the reported labor hours, the Los Angeles County Probation Department submitted the exact same spreadsheet that it submitted on September 21, 2012. The Honorable Judge Schnegg granted the People's request for time to investigate discrepancies apparent on the face of the documentation submitted to the Court on behalf of the Defendant. The Court then scheduled this Probation Violation Setting date.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The facts relevant to this motion include the following summary of an inquiry conducted by the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, Bureau of Investigation in an effort to verify the conclusory and inconsistent information contained in the spreadsheet provided to the Court.

District Attorney's Office Investigators traveled to Virginia and attempted to interview any of the individuals who may have been involved in the supervision of the Defendant's community labor. Individuals interviewed included representatives from: The Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections Probation and Parole Office (hereafter "Virginia Probation"); the City of Richmond Police Department; and the Tappahannock Children's Center. Reports of these interviews are attached and reference herein as Los Angeles County District Attorney Bureau of Investigation Supplemental Reports. (See People's Exhibit 4, hereafter, Exh. 4.) This inquiry revealed no credible, competent, or verifiable evidence that Defendant Brown performed his community labor as represented to this Court.

In fact, the evidence shows that although Virginia Probation accepted supervision of Defendant, no one from that Department ever approved, scheduled, supervised, monitored, or verified any of the community labor reported to this Court. Representations made by the Richmond Police Department regarding supervision, completion, documentation and reporting of the Defendant's labor are inconsistent, unreliable, and cannot be attributed to any source. Claims that the Defendant completed in excess of 500 hours of community labor at Tappahannock Children's Center cannot be verified or documented. In addition, claims that the Defendant cleaned, stripped and waxed floors at that location have been credibly contradicted.

No circumstance exists to justify the Court's acceptance of Defendant's purported completion of community labor when said labor has been self-scheduled, unsupervised, and essentially self-reported.

After a thorough review of all documents and evidence submitted to the Court it appears there are significant discrepancies indicating at best sloppy documentation and, at worst

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fraudulent reporting and possible misdemeanor violations of California Penal Code section 539 – "Fraudulent Certification of Completion of Court-Ordered Community Service."

The Accounting of Hours Submitted To This Court Is Inconsistent, Unsubstantiated and Unverifiable

In a letter dated August 24, 2009, Bryan T. Norwood, Chief of the Richmond Police Department represented to the Court that his department was "prepared to put Mr. Brown to work in the community performing manual labor tasks, such as graffiti removal, trash pick up, washing cars, cleaning, maintaining grounds, etc." Chief Norwood further stated the following regarding Defendant's activities:

"activities would be performed under the supervision of myself and those under my command and he [Defendant] will be responsible for paying any costs incurred regarding the facilitation of this arrangement to include, adequate security from the public (in the event they become aware of his presence) and one-on-one supervision where special projects are instituted. Proper documentation of his days/hours worked will be maintained in our files and we are willing to provide progress reports to the Court if the Court requires such."

(See People's Exhibit 5, hereafter Exh. 5.)

In a follow up letter to the Court, Chief Norwood represented that as of November 8, 2011, the Defendant "performed 103 days of community labor in the Richmond area." (See People's Exhibit 6, hereafter Exh. 6.) It should be noted that 103 days of labor at 8 hours a day is equivalent to 824 hours.

Three months later, on February 8, 2012, in a progress report from Virginia Probation, Supervising Officer E. Covington represented the Defendant "completed 701 hours of community labor thus far" and that . . . "he appears to be eligible to be released from further supervision." (See People's Exhibit 7, hereafter Exh. 7.) A comparison of the November 2011 report (of 103 days or 824 hours of labor) to the subsequent February 2012 report (of only 701 hours of labor) demonstrates a significant discrepancy in reporting. This discrepancy was noted and brought to the attention of the Court and the Defendant at the next regularly scheduled Probation Progress Reporting date.

Finally, in response to the Court's request for an accounting of the hours reported by the various departments, in a letter to the Court dated September 14, 2012 Chief Norwood claimed "[A]s of August 24, 2012 Chris Brown has successfully completed approximately 202 days of supervised manual/community labor in the Richmond area." (See People's Exhibit 8, hereafter Exh. 8.)

Completion of 202 days of labor at 8 hours a day is equivalent to 1616 hours of labor. Interestingly, the spreadsheet claims a total of only 1402 hours and 162 actual days of community labor. Even if it were reliable, the spreadsheet does not satisfy the Court ordered 180 days, or 1440 hours, of community labor.

On its face, and in combination with the remaining evidence, the spreadsheet which purports to compile the dates, locations and hours worked is not credible documentation of proof of completed community labor. As reported by Ms. Victoria Pearson, General Counsel for the Richmond Police Department, the spreadsheet was prepared by the Richmond Police Department in September 2012 at the request of the Defendant's attorney. This spreadsheet was transmitted directly to the Defendant's attorney. The Richmond Police Department did not provide the spreadsheet to the Virginia Department of Corrections Probation and Parole Office.

B. Neither the Virginia Probation Office Nor the Richmond Police Department Supervised the Community Labor Portion of this Defendant's Probation

1. <u>Virginia Department of Corrections Probation and Parole Office</u>

On November 8, 2012, Probation Officer Eric Covington, the Virginia Probation Officer assigned to supervise the Defendant's probation, was interviewed by District Attorney's Office Investigators. Officer Covington revealed that no one from his department scheduled, supervised, monitored or verified Mr. Brown's community labor. He stated this type of community labor arrangement was extremely unusual and such an agreement had never

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previously been entered into by his Department. His Department had never relinquished probation supervision to the Richmond Police Department or any other police department.

Officer Covington stated he was informed by Mr. Brown's attorney that the Court ordered Mr. Brown's community labor to be supervised, scheduled and overseen by Chief Norwood of the Richmond Police Department. Officer Covington said the Department kept a copy of the "Court order" in its files; however Officer Covington was unable to locate a copy of that Court order.

Officer Covington provided Chief Norwood with the required sign-in and sign-out log, to be completed by the Defendant and signed by the person supervising the work. Officer Covington also indicated their established procedure was to set up a schedule and require the probationer to show up on time and adhere to that schedule. Additionally, the community service and community labor locations, used by Officer Covington's department, are predesignated and familiar with the procedures used in supervising and documenting felony probationers.

City of Richmond Police Department 2.

On November 6, 2012, Investigators from the District Attorney's Office went to the Richmond Police Department and requested to speak with Chief Bryan Norwood. Ms. Victoria Pearson, General Counsel for the Richmond Police Department, indicated Chief Norwood was unavailable and offered to facilitate the inquiry regarding documentation of Mr. Brown's community labor. In doing so, Ms. Pearson facilitated interviews of the following personnel: Deputy Chief J. Buturla, Major M. Shamus, Detective R. Payne and Ms. Antoinette Archer. Following are summaries of the information gained through each of the interviews:

Ms. Pearson a.

Chief Bryan Norwood did not compose any of the Police Department's correspondence submitted to the Court. Ms. Pearson drafted the letters and submitted them to

the Chief for his signature. After the letters were signed, she did not submit them to Virginia's Probation Department. Instead, she sent them to the Defendant's attorney.

- Although all of Chief Norwood's correspondence to the Court states "[P]roper documentation of his days/hours worked will be maintained in our files" this documentation does not exist.
- 3. Additionally, the Chief's correspondence provided that the Defendant's "activities would be performed under the supervision of myself and those under my command and he will be responsible for paying any costs incurred regarding the facilitation of this arrangement to include . . . one-on-one supervision where special projects are instituted." Other than the submitted spreadsheet, no documentation exists for any of Mr. Brown's "activities" being "performed under the supervision" of the Richmond Police Department. As of December 31, 2012 the Richmond Police Department neither documented nor billed for costs incurred in the Department's "supervision" of the Defendant.
- 4. The only information supplied which purports to document the hours Richmond Police Department personnel expended supervising the Defendant is the "Overtime Valuation Report 09/01/2009 to 11/07/2012." (See People's Exhibit 9, hereafter Exh. 9.)

Analysis of this document reveals 21 separate dates where overtime was accrued to provide "protection" for Defendant Brown. However, on five of those dates (May 15, September 7 – 9, and November 7, 2010) no community labor is reported to have been performed by the Defendant. Instead, Richmond Police personnel provided a security detail for a concert performance by the Defendant.

The report details 18 separate dates documenting the Defendant's community labor. These dates fall between September 17, 2009 and March 9, 2010 (all of which are at the start of probation.) However, the spreadsheet documents 31 separate days of community labor performed between those same dates.

5. Ms. Pearson personally prepared the spreadsheet documenting the work completed by the Defendant. However, she has no personal knowledge of the scheduling, dates, hours, location or supervision of work completed. The spreadsheet submitted to the Court in

September 2012 was prepared using information received from Deputy Chief English. However, there are no documents to support the information received from Deputy Chief English.

- 6. Deputy Chief English was responsible for the oversight of Mr. Brown's community labor involving the Richmond Police Department. Deputy Chief English was also unavailable to be interviewed.
- 7. This arrangement was facilitated through the Richmond Police Department because of Mr. Brown's previously existing relationship with the department.

b. Detective Renee Payne

Detective Renee Payne and her partner were the primary Richmond Police Department personnel assigned to supervise Mr. Brown's community labor. Deputy Chief English provided Detective Payne with a schedule of dates, locations and times the labor was to take place. The work was originally scheduled during regular business hours. When asked why the spreadsheet refers to "various alleys" and not the actual location of work performed, Detective Payne explained that due to intense media interest she began scheduling work in this way to conceal Mr. Brown's presence.

Some time after the start of Mr. Brown's probation, Detective Payne was advised by Deputy Chief English that Mr. Brown would complete community labor at the Tappahannock Children's Center. This children's center is at least one hour's drive from Richmond. Deputy Chief English asked Detective Payne to make periodic checks on Mr. Brown's presence at the center and to do so after her regularly scheduled work hours. When Detective Payne made these periodic checks, she noted the Defendant was present with his mother, his body guard, his personal assistant and his sister. The "overtime" records show Detective Payne made nine trips to the Tappahannock Children's Center to verify the Defendant's presence at the center. On those dates the Defendant was with his body guard, personal assistant and mother; no other law enforcement personnel were present.

After several months of supervision, Detective Payne summarized the dates, times, locations and hours of work performed by the Defendant and forwarded that information

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to Ms. Pearson. At the time of her interview neither Detective Payne nor Ms. Pearson possessed that documentation.

When asked about documenting the Defendant's labor, Detective Payne said the dates, times, locations and description of work done was provided by Ms. Hawkins either through email or by phone. Detective Payne submitted that information to Deputy Chief English. Detective Payne was also given a copy of the Defendant's entire schedule which included tentative community labor dates. She specifically remembered an occasion where Mr. Brown's schedule indicated he was going to work on a particular Monday. Mr. Brown called Detective Payne and said he would only be available after 12:00 p.m. that Monday because he was participating in a charity basketball event in Washington D.C. Mr. Brown later called Detective Payne and said he would not work at all the day because he was still in Washington D.C. Detective Payne no longer possessed any documentation of the Defendant's personal schedule.

Ms. Antoinette Archer c.

Ms. Antoinette Archer is a civilian employee of the Richmond Police Department, assigned to the Human Resources Division. Ms. Archer reported that on several occasions Mr. Brown, along with his friends and bodyguard, appeared at the Human Resource Division to shred files for the Police Department. Ms. Archer supervised this activity. Mr. Brown did not report to work according to any schedule, instead he showed up based on his personal availability. Ms. Archer said she made no record of Mr. Brown's activities and is unaware of the existence of any records documenting Mr. Brown's activity under her supervision.

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Tappahannock Children's Center 3.

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On November 7, 2012 Investigators went to the Tappahannock Children's Center and interviewed Ms. Ida Minter. Ms. Minter is the current Administrator at the Children's Center. The Center is more than 40 miles and two counties east of the City of Richmond.

Ms. Minter said she had worked at the center for 32-1/2 years. She also said Ms. Joyce Hawkins, the Defendant's mother, had previously been the Director of the center. Although Ms. Hawkins was no longer involved in the day to day operations, she was still involved with the center and had her own set of keys to the facility. Ms. Minter was informed by Joyce Hawkins and the Defendant's attorney that the Defendant would be completing some of his court ordered community labor at the center. Ms. Minter did not object. However, she informed Ms. Hawkins that the work had to be done after hours when children were not present. According to Ms. Minter, neither the Richmond Police Department nor the Virginia Probation Department ever contacted her to coordinate or supervise Defendant's work at the center.

Ms. Minter was advised that Ms. Hawkins would use her own keys to allow the Defendant into the facility. It appears Defendant's mother was responsible for orchestrating this work outside of normal operating hours. Ms. Minter was never given a schedule as to when the Defendant would perform work at the facility, nor did she ever see the Defendant perform any work at the center. Ms. Minter assumed the Defendant completed the work because she smelled cleaning products and fresh paint. On several occasions she noticed the floors appeared to have been stripped and waxed and again assumed the Defendant had performed that work.

The center has routinely scheduled floor maintenance performed by a commercial floor cleaner. On the several occasions Ms. Minter noticed the floors appeared to have been stripped and waxed she called the person who performed the regularly scheduled maintenance and canceled the scheduled floor maintenance. Ms. Minter said she paid the floor cleaner for the cancelled work even though he did not perform the work.

When contacted by the Investigators, the commercial floor cleaner disclosed that he maintained the floors at the center for the last eight years. He said he has a set routine and schedule for buffing, stripping, and waxing the floors. This work is done after hours during the week and on every Saturday and Sunday. In the past three years, no one else has stripped or waxed the floors. He knows the Defendant and has not seen the Defendant at the center. He has never been contacted by Ms. Minter to cancel the regularly scheduled floor maintenance, nor has he accepted payment for work he did not perform.

. .

Shortly after speaking with the Investigators he was contacted by Ms. Minter. Ms. Minter attempted to tell him how to answer questions the Investigators may have about the Defendant's work at the center. He told Ms. Minter he would not lie to anyone about anything.

C. <u>Claimed "Labor" Was Not "Community" Labor Nor Was It</u> <u>Performed In Defendant's County of Residence</u>

The Defendant's residence is in Montpelier, Virginia. The Defendant requested his probation supervision be transferred to Virginia so that he would be able to perform community labor in his community. Representations were made which led the Court and People to believe that all "community labor" would be performed in the Defendant's community. The Court and the People assumed the Defendant would complete the community labor in the area of his residence. It was never contemplated that the Defendant would orchestrate completion of community labor: 1) outside of the community in which he lived; 2) outside of his assigned Probation Supervision District; 3) selectively in coordination with a Police Department outside his County of residence; and 4) outside the jurisdiction of the police department allegedly supervising his community labor. Not one day or even one hour of his claimed community labor was performed in his own County or in his assigned Probation Supervision District.

The Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections Probation and Parole Office accepted supervision of the Defendant and assigned Mr. Brown to District 41 of the Central Division, in Ashland, VA. This supervision district is located in Hanover County.

The city of Richmond is not located in Hanover County, nor is it located in District 41. Probation Officer E. Covington stated that Virginia Probation has never permitted the Richmond Police Department to assume probation supervision duties of convicted felons.

The Defendant allegedly completed in excess of 500 hours of community labor at "Tappa Day Care." "Tappa Day Care" is actually the Tappahannock Children's Center, located in Tappahannock, Essex County, VA. It is in Virginia Probation's "Eastern Division," separated by at least three counties and more than 60 miles from the Defendant's home. The claimed community labor performed at the center was orchestrated and scheduled through Ms. Joyce

Hawkins, the Defendant's mother. Ms. Hawkins has historically had lengthy personal and financial interests in Tappahannock Children's Center, such that she maintains keys to the facility and has full access to the center at any time. Ms. Hawkins was the Director of the Center and has previously served on the Board of Directors of the center's parent corporation, A.C.T.I.O.N, Inc.

As represented by the current Administrator of Tappahannock Children's Center, the Defendant's mother orchestrated Mr. Brown's work at the Center. Ms Hawkins used her personal keys to provide after hours access for the Defendant and his companions into the center, without probation or law enforcement supervision. Unsupervised and uncorroborated "community labor" under these circumstances, while accompanied by a body guard, personal assistant, and others outside of his own residential community was not the type of community labor the Court or the People agreed to as a condition of the Defendant's supervised probation.

D. <u>Defendant Brown Could Not Have Performed Community Labor</u> <u>As Claimed Because He Was Not Physically Present In the</u> Commonwealth of Virginia on Several of the Reported Dates

1. October 23, 2010

On October 23, 2010, Defendant Brown was not physically present in Richmond, Virginia when he was reported to be performing community labor under the supervision of the Richmond Police Department. Mr. Brown was in Washington D.C., participating in the Eunice Kennedy Shriver Challenge which took place on Saturday October 23, 2010. Mr. Brown was the official host for this charity event. His presence at that event in Washington D.C. was well documented and reported in the news. (See People's Exhibit 10, hereafter Exh. 10.)

However, on that same date, October 23, 2010, the Richmond Police Department's spreadsheet reports the Defendant worked from "1000 -1800" in Richmond, VA at "300 Block West Grace St. 8 hrs." Richmond is approximately 120 miles from Washington D.C. making it impossible for the Defendant to be anywhere near the "300 Block West Grace St." as reported to this Court.

2. March 15, 2012

The Richmond Police Department reported that the Defendant was "picking up trash" for "4" hours in the "3rd Precinct" between "1000-1800." If, in fact, he would have worked from "1000 to 1800" he would actually be working eight hours instead of the claimed "4" hours.

Information obtained from Excelaire Service, Inc., a private airline, shows the Defendant was en route from Richmond to Cancun on March 15, 2012. The Defendant was on a private jet which left Richmond at 4:00 p.m. (1600 hours) Boarding a private jet prior to 1600 hours makes it physically impossible for the Defendant to have picked up trash between 1000-1800 hours (10:00 a.m. – 6:00 p.m.) on March 15, 2012.

3. December 12, 2011

The Richmond Police Department spreadsheet reported the Defendant performed "trash pick up" for "8" hours in a one block area of "1100-1200 N. 22nd St." in Richmond between "900-1700" hours. However, information from the Department of Homeland Security showed the Defendant's passport was cleared on December 12, 2011 at Dulles International Airport, outside Washington D.C., at 6:44 a.m. after returning from Dubai on a commercial airline. Richmond is approximately 120 miles from Dulles airport. It would be unreasonable to believe that after a 12-13 hour flight, the Defendant rushed through Customs and the Washington D.C. early morning rush hour traffic, traveled directly to Richmond in just over two hours, and then worked eight straight hours picking up trash in a one block area.

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ARGUMENT

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THE COURT MAY MODIFY DEFENDANT'S PROBATION UPON PETITION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY

Section 1203.2, subdivision (b) clearly states in relevant part that upon the petition of the district attorney, the court may modify, revoke or terminate supervision of the Defendant's order of probation.

Upon its own motion or upon the petition of the supervised person, the probation or parole officer or the district attorney of the county in which the person is supervised, the court may modify, revoke, or terminate supervision of the person pursuant to this subdivision...

The court shall give notice of its motion, and the probation or parole officer or the district attorney shall give notice of his or her petition to the supervised person, his or her attorney of record, and the district attorney or the probation or parole officer, as the case may be...

After the receipt of a written report from the probation or parole officer, the court shall read and consider the report and either its motion or the petition and may modify, revoke, or terminate the supervision of the supervised person upon the grounds set forth in subdivision (a) if the interests of justice so require.

(Cal. Pen. C § 1203.2 (b).)

Furthermore, the court may revoke or modify Defendant's probation for abusing the privileges granted him, or engaging in deception.

Probation is an act of clemency and may be withdrawn if the privilege is abused. An abuse of privilege is shown where a defendant practices a deception upon the court at the time probation is granted [citation] or violates any of the terms or conditions of probation.

(In re Solis (1969) 274 Cal.App.2d 344, 348, hereafter Solis.)

The Court of Appeal in *Solis, supra*, went on to state that, "[i]n such case the court is specifically authorized to modify and change any and all of the terms and conditions of probation," and that "[I]ts determination must be based upon the facts before it." (*Solis, supra*, at pp. 348-349.)

Finally, because Defendant is a probationer, "[t]he activities of a probationer are thus subject to more careful official scrutiny than those of other citizens." (*People v. Perez* (1966) 243 Cal.App.2d 528, 532.)

ADDITIONAL POTENTIAL PROBATION VIOLATIONS

1. January 27, 2013

The defendant was involved in a fight on January 27, 2013 at a recording studio in West Hollywood, CA. A preliminary investigation by The Los Angels County Sheriff's Department revealed that when leaving a recording studio with several friends, the Defendant extended his hand to shake hands with another musician, Mr. C. Breaux. Mr. Breaux refused to shake hands with the Defendant and informed Defendant Brown that his car was parked in Mr. Breaux's assigned parking space. The Defendant punched Mr. Breaux on the side of his face. Two of the Defendant's friends also began to punch Mr. Breaux. After two to three minutes they stopped punching Mr. Breaux and Defendant Brown said "[W]e can bust on you too!" "Bust" is a slang term used on the street to mean shoot. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department is continuing this investigating.

2. August 15, 2012

In Probation Progress Report No. 12 a letter from The Commonwealth of Virginia Department of Corrections Probation and Parole Office was submitted to this Court. (See People's Exhibit 11, hereafter Exh. 11.) The letter, dated August 15, 2012, describes several probation violations involving the use of marijuana and the failure to obtain a travel permit, committed by the Defendant.

a. Marijuana – June 18, 2012

On June 18, 2012 the Defendant tested positive for marijuana use. When informed of this positive test, the Defendant claimed he was authorized to use marijuana for medical purposes. He presented a card from a California acupuncturist purportedly recommending such use. The Defendant was informed that the Commonwealth of Virginia has no laws permitting the use of marijuana in any form, and such use is not permitted while on

Pursuant to the California Business and Professions Code section 4937, an acupuncturist is specifically prohibited from recommending or prescribing marijuana for any purpose. (Calif. Business and Professions Code sect. 4977(d).) Under these circumstances, the Defendant's possession, use, or being under the influence of marijuana in any form is in violation of both California and Virginia's laws.

b. Travel Permit. July 2012

This Defendant was specifically ordered to obtain "prior approval before he leaves the country subject to the Court's permission and also to approval of the Probation Department." (See People's Exhibit 12 at page 11 lines 9 -12, hereafter Exh. 12.) Prior to July 22, 2012 the Defendant was very familiar with Probation's requirements for travel as he had already obtained in excess of 35 travel permits from Virginia Probation. However, prior to leaving for a Court approved trip to Paris on July 22, 2012, he was again instructed to report to the Probation office to sign and receive his travel permit. The Defendant did not report, nor did he sign or receive a travel permit, and left the country without the Probation Officer's permission. After this trip to Paris, the Defendant returned to Virginia and did not contact the Probation office. His failure to report, sign and receive the travel permit is in violation of probation. His failure to report upon re-entry to the United States and return to Virginia is a separate and additional violation of the travel conditions.

3. February 19, 2012

At approximately 4:00 a.m. the Defendant was leaving a nightclub with his then current girlfriend and members of his entourage. As he got into a limousine a female fan attempted to take a photograph of the Defendant and his girlfriend. The Defendant reached over the female passengers in the car, grabbed the phone from the fan's hand and said "Bitch you're not going to put these pictures on a website." The windows of the limousine went up and the car drove off, in a line with several other vehicles. The female fan pursued the car demanding her phone be returned. The front seat passenger cracked his window and told her the phone had been

tossed from the car. The female searched for her phone, but could not find it. The female reported the phone theft to the Miami Police Department.

The phone was tracked and located, three days later, on a tour bus belonging to one of the entertainers who was with the Defendant on February 19, 2012. The Miami Police Department interviewed eleven people regarding this theft. The Office of the State Attorney in Florida declined to file criminal charges in this case. However, the evidence clearly shows the Defendant took the phone by force from the fan's hand. This action reflects the Defendant's anger management problems and at a minimum constitutes petty theft.

4. March 22, 2011

On March 22, 2011 while being interviewed for a segment on the Good Morning America television show in New York City, the Defendant became angry when asked questions about his assault on Rhianna. In response, the Defendant threw a chair through a glass window, breaking the window. This act of vandalism is another demonstration of the Defendant's anger control issues and violent temper resulting in a violation of the law.

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CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is respectfully requested that this Court decline to accept the records of community labor which have been supplied to the Court. The Defendant has failed to provide the Court with competent evidence of performing the labor as ordered. The People accordingly request this Court terminate the prior consent permitting Defendant to complete his community labor requirement in Virginia. It is further requested the Court modify the conditions of probation by ordering Defendant Brown to fulfill his obligation of 180 days of community labor here in Los Angeles County, under the appropriate supervision of the Probation Department as ordered by the Court in the original grant of probation.

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Dated: February 6, 2013

Respectfully submitted, JACKIE LACEY

District Attorney of Los Angeles County

By